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 One normative clarification and some empirical issues 
Martin Beck 
The present news analysis argues that experts on the Middle East have been 
pre-occupied with the issue of democratic pervasiveness of Islam(ists), where-
as the democratic conviction of liberals and seculars was more or less taken 
for granted. However, secular liberals are not necessarily democratic, particu-
larly not when exposed to a troublesome transition process after a decades-
long political socialization in a secular authoritarian system. The major prob-
lem of the instable Egyptian transition process is that the two potentially 
democratic actors of the post-Mubarak system—the Muslim Brotherhood and 
the secular liberals—have been entrenched in a kulturkampf rather than coop-
erating with each other, which further increased the already strong role of 
actors of the old regime, particularly the military elite. 
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n July 3rd, 2013, democratically elected Egyptian President Mohamed Mursi was 
deposed from Presidency by the military. To conclude that the action taken by the 
Egyptian army was illegitimate if democratic standards are applied is so obvious that, 
at first glance, it appears not worthwhile to tackle the question in depth. Rather, one 
could argue that on the basis of safe normative ground we should immediately pro-
ceed with applying an empirical perspective on analyzing the causes and reasons of 
the military coup. However, in the present case, there are good reasons to also deal 
with the normative dimension of the issue. Why so? Firstly, the immediate public reac-
tion in Egypt was dominated by cheering crowds on the Tahrir square whose claim 
that the military coup was legitimate left a major impact both on many Middle Eastern 
and Western observers.1 Moreover, some internationally renowned Egyptian politi-
cians, particularly peace Nobel Prize winner Muhamed al-Baradei insisted that the 
coup actually is compatible with democratic standards.2 Last but not least, the reaction 
of Western actors was much more moderate than in other cases when democratically 
elected heads of states were put under arrest: US President Barack Obama expressed 
concerns over the military coup and opted for a speedy return to democratic proce-
dures; however, he refrained from demanding the re-installation of Mr. Mursi as dem-
ocratically elected Egyptian President. 
The official charges that were leveled against Mursi immediately after his deposi-
tion are extremely weak indeed—one of the main points is “insulting the judiciary.”3 
Thus, the army did not even make the effort of accusing Mursi with severe misuse of 
office or treason. Other informal justifications are even more obscure, such as the mili-
tary coup was the only way to avoid a civil war or the failure of Mr. Mursi’s govern-
ment to improve Egypt’s economic situation. The former argument is not convincing 
because in the case of an imminent civil war the army would have been obliged to pro-
tect democratically elected institutions and representatives rather than overthrow the 
government. If a failed economic policy would make coup d’états justifiable, we should 
see quite some of them in contemporary Europe.4 It is a well-protected right in demo-
cratic systems to organize demonstrations and to use other constitutional means to 
convince the government to alter its politics, to step down or to accept new elections—
but if this does not work out, you have to wait for the next ballots to come. 
                                                          
1
 BBC: Egypt Crowds Cheer Tahrir Square Military Flypast, July 4
th
, 2013, available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23190817.  
2
 Guardian: Mohamed ElBaradei’s Appointment as Egypt’s Interim PM Thrown into Doubt July 7th, 
2013, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jul/06/mohamed-elbaradei-interim-pm-
opposition 
3
 BBC: Egypt Army Arrests Key Muslim Brotherhood Figures, July 4th, 2013, available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23189180. 
4
 Guardian: Mohamed Morsi. The Egyptionan Opposition Charge Sheet, July 3rd, 2013, available at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jul/03/mohamed-morsi-egypt-president-opposition 
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How then does one explain the reactions to the Egyptian military coup that show 
so much normative vagueness - and even confusion in quite a few cases - if democratic 
standards are applied?  
Ever since the electoral victories of Islamist parties in the Arab Spring, there is a 
strong tendency to confine the debate on the pervasiveness of democratic values on the 
Islamists. Thus, heated scholarly debates emerged whether the Islamists in Egypt and 
Tunisia are—or more or less inevitably will become—democratic (Roy 2012: 7, 2013) or 
whether they might use their newly acquired power to pursue their hidden agenda of 
establishing an Islamic state (Fradkin 2013). This debate made reference to a decade-
old scholarly dispute whether Islamism is an ideology that cannot be cured from its 
totalitarian underpinnings (Tibi 2008) or whether Islamists as a result of the inherently 
secular logic of the state are likely to adjust to it, thereby implying that they will de-
mocratize if the political system is democratic (Tripp 1996: 63). 
The ideologically heated debate on democracy and Islam(ism) tends to be blind to 
the fact that not only Islamism but also systems of belief with Western roots often have 
trouble adapting to democratic structures. The question is why this is so. Firstly, social-
ization plays a certain role: After decades of experiencing anti-Islamist authoritarian 
regimes, not all liberals and/or secularists find it easy to accept a system in which reli-
gion plays a significant role in public life and in which anti-secularist and anti-liberal 
movements can freely develop as long as they respect the law. Moreover, often it is 
seen as a truism that the modern urban middle classes play a crucial role in establish-
ing democracies. Yet, it is too frequently overlooked that representatives of the “en-
lightened” middle classes under certain circumstances may slow down the process of 
democratization rather than promoting it if they fear the society is composed of too 
many “non-enlightened” people. Secondly, in a transition process trust in democratic 
procedures and institutions is not yet well developed because actors have not experi-
enced the system functioning to the benefit of all. Nota bene, this applies to all political 
actors regardless of their ideology. 
In the Egyptian case in the period between the first free and democratic elections 
and the July 2013 military coup, both the Islamists and the liberal secularists showed 
some limits in fully accepting democratic norms and principles. Thus, the Muslim 
Brotherhood pushed through a constitution that failed to protect the basic rights of 
believers of non-Abrahamic religions and avoided reference to gender equality. How-
ever, as has been shown, contrary to the Muslim Brotherhood, the secular opposition 
actively encouraged the basic violation of democratic values by supporting the military 
coup. Some of their major representatives such as al-Baradei even openly cooperated 
with the military establishment. Why did they do so? 
The secular opposition had become increasingly frustrated in the course of the 
transition process: Although they were proud to take the credits for having removed 
Hosni Mubarak from office, they had to face electoral defeats. At the same time, major 
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representatives of the old guard managed to preserve their privileges, particularly the 
military. Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood not only left the diverse businesses of the mili-
tary sector untouched but also privileged the army in the new constitution, for instance 
by establishing a powerful National Defense Council whose majority is composed of 
army representatives (Ginsburg 2012). 
With the removal of Mubarak, four power centers became pre-eminent in the 
Egyptian system: the military establishment, the judicial elite (which has been, howev-
er, deeply split between pro/anti-Mubarak and pro/anti-Brotherhood segments), the 
Muslim Brotherhood, and the oppositional National Salvation Front. In contrast to Tu-
nisia, the first major structural problem of the transition process in Egypt was that the 
degree of cooperation between the four camps was quite limited—particularly among 
the new actors in the system, the Muslim Brotherhood and the liberal secular opposi-
tion (Stepan/Linz 2013:  21-23). Rather than joining ranks in checking the influence of 
the institutions of the old regime, their mutual relations were increasingly driven by a 
kulturkampf ideology. Thus, rather than concentrating conflicts on specific issues—such 
as women’s rights or freedom of religion—the secular opposition more and more agi-
tated against those that allegedly betrayed the revolution. The Muslim Brotherhood on 
its part entrenched on its democratic majority. As a result of pressure from the other 
two power centers, things only got worse. Thus, when the judicial sector threatened to 
dissolve the constituent assembly,5 the Muslim Brotherhood decided to rush the consti-
tution by an immediate referendum. A highlight with a touch of historical irony oc-
curred on July 3rd, 2013, when the Islamist President of Egypt delivered a speech in 
which he did not say much beyond repeatedly claiming his office’s democratic legiti-
macy—for which he was treated with scorn by many secular liberals.6 
At the same time, both the Muslim Brotherhood and the opposition competed in 
courting the military. By doing so, the undemocratic ideal of the Egyptian army as an 
elitist guardian of the state that is entitled to interfere when those that deal with the 
lows of day-to-day politics fail to deliver was being served. Moreover, in July 2013 it 
appears that both actors greatly over-estimated their own power capabilities in their 
relations with the army: Mursi seems to have believed that removing Field Marshal 
Hussein Tantawi and other generals was sufficient to control the army and at least part 
of the opposition appears to have been so naïve to believe that the military coup was 
an intervention on behalf of the people to whom political power will be immediately 
returned thereafter. What remains to be seen is whether we have just two or (in the 
long run) possibly three losers of the first period of Egyptian politics after the removal 
of Mubarak. After the massive reaction of the Muslim Brotherhood also the army will 
                                                          
5
 Guardian: Egyptian Court Decides whether to Dissolve Islamist-dominated Assembly, October 23rd, 
2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/23/egypt-mohamed-morsi. 
6
 Al-Arabiya English, July 3rd, 2013, available at: 
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/media/2013/07/03/Mursi-s-speech-How-Twitter-and-one-angry-TV-guest-
reacted-.html. 
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have trouble to simply retreat to the status quo ante when it could act as the “guardi-
an” without getting politicized by “daily politics.”  
 
Conclusion 
What does the military coup in July 2013 tell us about the transition process in Egypt? 
Has it been a transition process at all? Yes, it has. However, as the result of a political 
system dominated by four more or less independent actors—the military, the juridical 
system, the Muslim Brotherhood and the secular liberal opposition-- with uneasiness 
in mutual cooperation, the Egyptian transition process from the very beginning ap-
peared much less promising in terms of successful democratization than the Tunisian 
case (Beck/Hüser 2012: 17-20). At the same time, it would be too simple to conclude 
that the transition process has been terminated with the military coup in July 2013. 
First and foremost, it is rather unlikely that the Egyptian military intends to institu-
tionalize an authoritarian system with the military as the sole legitimate political deci-
sion-maker. If so, the military would be taken responsible for all major political devel-
opments by a highly politicized post-Arab-Spring society, thereby losing its role as a 
guardian of politics. Moreover, if the Brotherhood is to be permanently excluded from 
political participation, the legitimacy of the new political system will suffer among ma-
jor parts of society. At the same time, other Islamist groups such as the Salafists (who 
are both more radical and politically less experienced) could start to play a more im-
portant role in the formal political system. Transition processes are long-lasting, open-
ended and non-linear processes. Thus, although hopes for a successful democratization 
process in Egypt have certainly experienced a major blow, it cannot be ruled out that in 
the long run just the July 2013 military coup may appear as just a major setback in an 
eventually successful transition process. 
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